Judicial
Appointments to the Supreme Court of Canada
June 2004
(Please
refer to end notes for italicized and bolded figures)
I. Introduction
Justices
Arbour and Iaocobucci recently announced that they are retiring from
the Supreme Court of Canada, positions that must be filled by summer
2004 for the Court to address its busy fall schedule. This news, coupled
with Prime Minister Martin's promise to reform the appointment process
as part of his efforts to address the "democratic deficit"
and Conservative Party leader Stephen Harper's past criticisms of
the Court and court appointments generally suggests that reform is
coming to the appointment process, whether one supports reform or
not.
This paper will
describe the current process, identify its strengths and weaknesses,
articulate a basic set of principles that should be met by any appointment
process and examine various options for reform. Recommendations will
also be made about an appropriate process.
This paper suggests
that there are sound and compelling reasons of principle to support
reform but that those same principles also indicate that some types
of reforms are acceptable while others are not.
II. The Current
Process for Appointments to the Supreme Court of Canada
Formally, the
legal source for the existence of the Supreme Court of Canada resides
in the Constitution Act, 1867 (formerly known as the British
North America Act). Under section 101 of this Act, the Parliament
of Canada has the legal authority to provide "for the Constitution,
Maintenance, and Organization of a General Court of Appeal for Canada".
Pursuant to this constitutional authority, the federal government
has promulgated the Supreme Court Act. Under section 4(2) of
this legislation, judges are appointed by the Governor in Council
(i.e. the Cabinet).
There is some
confusion about who actually appoints judges to the Supreme Court
of Canada. While formally, it is the entire Cabinet, Hogg suggests
that the Prime Minister is responsible for appointing the Chief Justice
of the Supreme Court and will be involved in the selection of "puisne"
(i.e. sitting judges) of the Court along with the Minister of Justice.
1 As a matter of law, at least three sitting judges
must come from Quebec (section 6 of the Supreme Court Act)
and as a matter of convention, three judges originate from Ontario,
two from Western Canada and one from the four Atlantic provinces.
The only explicit qualification for membership on the Court is that
a candidate either must currently sit as a judge of a superior court
of a province or have been a member of a law society for at least
ten years (section 5).
As part of its
deliberations regarding the appointment process in 2004, the House
of Commons Standing Committee on Justice, Human Rights, Public Safety
and Emergency Preparedness ("Justice Committee" heard testimony
from Irwin Cotler, the Minister of Justice and Attorney General of
Canada, on March 30, 2004 during which he described the current appointment
process. 2 The Minister notes in his
address that the process he describes can not lay claim to be followed
in every past appointment. However, he has established a more formal
"protocol" based on past practice. He also committed to
following the protocol in the future while he is Minister of Justice
until there is a substantive change to the process.
Mr. Cotler describes
two parts to this process including the identification of outstanding
candidates and the assessment of identified candidates. The Minister
of Justice undertakes both parts of this process by a series of consultations
involving the following people:
Chief Justice of Canada or other sitting members (to discuss needs
of the Court)
Attorney(s) General of province or region
Chief Justice(s) of province or region and Chief Justice of trial
level superior court
President of Canadian Bar Association and local CBA representatives
of province or region
President(s) of law society of province or region.
The Minister's
consultations involve a considerable degree of back and forth discussions.
He will also take into account any submissions made by individuals
or groups on their own initiative.
In the second
phase of the process, leading candidates are assessed for merit by
assessing their professional capacity, personal characteristics and
diversity:
Professional
capacity: superior intellectual ability, analytical and writing
skills, proven ability to listen to all sides of an issue and maintain
an open mind, decisiveness and soundness of judgement, capacity to
manage heavy workload in a collaborative environment, capacity to
manage stress and isolation of judicial role, strong cooperative skills,
awareness of social context, bilingual capacity, specific expertise
required for the Court
Personal characteristics:
impeccable personal and professional ethics, honesty, integrity and
forthrightness, respect and regard for others, patience, courtesy,
tact, humility, impartiality, tolerance, responsibility, common sense,
punctuality and reliability
Diversity:
"the extent to which the court's composition adequately reflects
the diversity of Canadian society"
The Department
of Justice also considers "jurisprudential profiles" regarding
volume of decisions, areas of expertise, outcome of appeals, and the
degree to which decisions have been followed by lower courts.
During this process
the Minister will consult with the Prime Minister who may undertake
his own consultations. 3 After this process, the
Minister of Justice will recommend a candidate to the Prime Minister
after which "preferred candidate is then chosen". The Prime
Minister recommends the choice to Cabinet which then essentially endorses
the recommendation. The appointment is formalized by an order of the
Governor General. In his submission to the Justice Committee, Mr.
Cotler indicates that the Prime Minister has "final responsibility"
for the appointment.
The strengths
of this process are identified primarily through the fact that there
is considerable consensus among experts that appointments to the Court
at least over the last thirty years have been considered to be excellent.
Expert witnesses to the Justice Committee that recently examined the
process have noted that the Supreme Court of Canada, as an institution,
is highly regarded in the juridical world community and its judgements
are adopted by foreign courts, notably by the courts of Israel and
South Africa.
The obvious weakness
of this system may be its lack of transparency and consequently the
fact that the formal procedure is unclear even among members of the
legal community. Such uncertainty endangers legitimacy and breeds
a lack of confidence in the process, if not among "experts"
then at least in the general public, a danger to be avoided if the
institution of the Supreme Court of Canada is to maintain its high
regard in Canada and elsewhere. Critics argue that Canada is the only
western liberal democracy with such a closed and discretionary system
for high court appointments.
In addition, some
experts argue that, if not true in fact, there is at least the problem
of a perception of danger that the Court appointments could be politicized
when the Prime Minister has ultimate authority to determine appointments
with little in the way of formal constraints upon his choice. 4
While no one has criticized past appointments as being purely partisan
or political, at least at the Supreme Court of Canada level, with
no formal constraints on the process, there is a legitimate concern
that judicial independence might be at risk if the Prime Minister
appoints only those he sees as friendly to his government and its
policy.
To the best of
our knowledge, though no known politician or expert has argued that
certain appointments to the Supreme Court have been politically motivated,
the same is not true of appointments in lower courts including Courts
of Appeal. As you may recall, in September of 2003, Stephen Harper
alleged that the Liberal government and the courts had conspired via
appointments of judges friendly to rendering judgements to laws prohibiting
same-sex marriages as unconstitutional so that the Liberal government
could sidestep the political controversy by permitting courts to decide
the question:
"I think
it's a typical hidden agenda of the Liberal party ... They had the
courts do it for them, they put the judges in they wanted, then they
failed to appeal C failed to fight the case in court ... I think the
federal government deliberately lost this case in court and got the
change to the law done through the back door." 5
This allegation
was roundly criticized in the media for various reasons including
the fact that Roy McMurtry, the Chief Justice of the Ontario Court
of Appeal and one of three judges who ruled unanimously in striking
down the common law restriction of marriage to heterosexual couples
in Halpern v. Canada (Attorney General) 6,
was appointed by Brian Mulroney's Progressive Conservative Party of
Canada and had previously been an Attorney General of Ontario in Bill
Davis Conservative government.
Harper continues
to make comments that could be construed as challenging the notion
of judicial independence, a principle that is discussed later in this
paper. In particular, Mr. Harper has stated that he believes that
the Supreme Court of Canada would refuse to interfere with federal
legislation prohibiting same-sex marriages:
"I am confident
that if the Parliament expresses its views clearly on this, which
is something that Parliament refused to do under the Liberals, then
I am quite certain that the Supreme Court will understand that and
respect Parliament's competency to deal with such a matter,".
Mr. Harper made this statement after being asked whether he would
use the notwithstanding clause to override a Court decision endorsing
same-sex marriages. 7
While Mr. Harper
might simply be playing politics with the debate about appointments,
his comments demonstrate that, however much one might believe that
past Court appointments were non-politicized, there are important
political players who might be more motivated to take into account
purely political concerns when appointing judges to the Court. The
primary point to underscore here is that, under our current system
of appointments, there are no formal constraints or procedural safeguards
to prevent this from happening. The wisdom of relying on the good
faith of future Prime Ministers to honour this approach is questionable
if one is concerned about ensuring judicial independence.
In addition, it
is also important to note that a major impetus of the move to reform
the Court appointment process has emanated from a group of academics
and political commentators who have been very critical of what they
call "judicial activism" by the Court. 8
These critics argue that the Supreme Court has, without justification
or authority, usurped the supremacy of parliaments (both federal and
provincial) by invalidating legislation mostly through the Court's
interpretation of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms and/or
imposed a theory of constitutional review that does not give due credence
to the original intent of framers of the Charter. As a means
of redressing this inappropriate judicial activism and ensuring judicial
accountability, these critics seek to reform the Court's appointment
process to permit a greater degree of Parliamentary scrutiny over
the membership of the Court. For reasons articulated in greater degree
elsewhere, the B.C. Civil Liberties Association should oppose their
concerns about judicial activism and should be wary of their motives
for and substance of their recommendations for reform. In brief, their
criticisms ought to be rejected as contrary to the fundamental principles
of the rule of law and judicial independence; they simply do not adequately
reflect the complexity of the institutions and structure of constitutional
democracy that now exists in Canada. 9
It is fair to
suggest that many within the Conservative Party of Canada, if not
Stephen Harper personally, share these same, invalid concerns with
respect to judicial activism. It is reasonable to be concerned that
such concerns may hold considerable authority in Ottawa if not in
2004, then at some point in the not too distant future.
It should also
be noted as will be discussed later in this paper, these concerns
regarding politicization do not preclude a system in which the Prime
Minister has significant influence with respect to the choice of appointments.
The purpose of this discussion is to point out that the current system
is vulnerable to outright politicization with no constraints to guard
against such manipulation. For those reasons, there are strong reasons
to support reform to the current process to ensure the integrity of
the Court by safeguarding the principles of judicial independence
and impartiality as further discussed below.
III. Other
Processes
As noted above,
Canada is somewhat unique in western liberal democracies for locating
the authority to appoint members to the highest court in the leader
of government without any checks or balances. While there are many
other countries with processes different than Canada, many of which
utilize some sort of judicial appointments commission or committee,
this discussion will focus on the process for appointing justices
to the United States Supreme Court because it is both revered and
reviled as a model to emulate.
Briefly, U.S.
Supreme Court justices are appointed according to the American constitution
in a two-step process: nomination by the president and then confirmation
by the senate. The specific mechanics of this process were not spelled
out in the constitution, so there is debate about different meanings
for "nomination" and "confirmation". As a matter
of convention, the Senate Judiciary Committee researches the candidates'
qualifications and then makes a recommendation to the full senate.
The full senate does not have to follow this recommendation; it votes
and if 51 of the 100 senators vote in favor, then the person is confirmed.
One aspect that has evolved over the years is the development of the
tradition of hearings held by the Senate Judiciary Committee at which
various people testify. Previously just lawyers who knew the nominee
professionally testified but witnesses now include the nominee and
representatives of interest groups representing different points of
view, such as civil rights groups. Several nominations, especially
Robert Bork in 1987 and Clarence Thomas in 1991, have been highly
publicized (via TV, newspapers, etc.) with interest groups and individuals
lobbying their senators to endorse or reject nominees. Voter interest
in appointments has increased significantly since 1913 when senators
were first elected by popular voting.
The fact that
the American nomination process has become so politicized is both
an advantage and disadvantage. To the extent that a broad spectrum
of Americans are interested in and perhaps engaged in lobbying for
a particular nominee, this process may be construed as healthy by
some. Conversely, whether as a cause or effect of such intense public
interest, nominations by the President often have the appearance of
significantly more politicization in the sense that nominees are understood
to have clearly held views about the many moral issues that the court
will confront in its deliberations whether that be abortion, gay rights
or gun control. Presidents thus nominate individuals who they believe
will best mirror their own politics. Some might argue that the spoils
of victory should permit the Executive branch to shape public policy
through the choice of preferred judges who may provide favourable
decisions to preferred government policy. From a judicial independence
and impartiality point of view in which it is important to separate
the judicial branch from the legislative and executive branches of
government, as discussed later in this brief, this reality is perceived
as a major disadvantage of the American system. It is noteworthy that
no other country in the world has adopted the American model, especially
with respect to public confirmation hearings. As the American system
is enshrined in their constitution, it is very difficult, if not impossible,
to change though arguably hearings per se are not a constitutional
requirement.
IV. Principles
Any process for
judicial appointments to the Supreme Court of Canada must be guided
by an overarching set of principles. Ideally, such principles should
be enshrined in law in order to properly guide the appointment process.
These principles would provide the framework for three key elements
of the process: who makes appointments, how they are made and on what
basis they are made.
The following
principles will be essential to the appointment process and should
act as the foundations upon which one answers the questions of who,
how and what.
-
-
-
Judicial
Independence and Impartiality
1. Appointments
must be based on merit.
Merit must be
the overriding reason for appointing a particular individual to the
Supreme Court of Canada. Thus, the appointment process must be one
that is designed to best assess the merit of potential candidates
both in terms of who participates in this process and what considerations
are taken into account in the assessment. Of course there will be
a variety of factors to consider in making appointments based on merit.
The factors the Minister of Justice weighs in considering the merit
of a potential candidate - professional capacity, personal characteristics
and diversity - are a strong starting point as a check list for a
thorough assessment. While there must be a degree of flexibility in
designing a process, it would be important to enshrine the principle
of merit into a legal requirement so that those responsible for choosing
or recommending appropriate candidates for the Court must select and
justify their decisions according to merit.
2. Appointments
to the Court must be made in such a way as to promote the democratic
legitimacy of the Court.
An appointment
process must be perceived to be legitimate by all Canadians and promote
the legitimacy of the Court. To achieve democratic legitimacy, the
process must engender public confidence that appointments will be
made according to merit and not for partisan political purposes. One
of the problems with the current process is that there is the potential,
if not real evidence of past practice, for the Prime Minister to make
appointments for partisan political reasons.
For the Supreme
Court to maintain its legitimacy, there must be general confidence
in the appointment process. While there will naturally be criticism
of any particular Court decision, at time strong criticism, the source
for this criticism should not emanate from an unfair, opaque, appointment
process that is potentially subject to partisanship. Thus, this process
must hold the general confidence of the following segments of the
population:
The Judiciary:
To attract the most qualified jurists, the process must be one that
the judiciary in general holds in high esteem. Members of the Court
must believe that they merit their appointments and so must their
colleagues at other levels of court whose decisions will be subject
to review by the Supreme Court and who must follow Supreme Court precedents.
Those who aspire to membership in the Court must be willing to be
subject to the review process for candidates and thus to attract top
candidates, the process must be transparent and fair.
This point is
important in Canada where the candidate pool for the Court, especially
from smaller regions like Atlantic Canada, is going to be relatively
small. We want to be careful not to discourage the best candidates
by subjecting them to an appointment process that may be overly politicized
or potentially risky to their current careers. It is important to
remember that the best candidates will have other career options sometimes
more attractive than working in Ottawa.
Legal Community:
As fellow guardians of the rule of law and as advocates before the
Court, lawyers and legal and other academics must also believe that
appointments are of the highest quality.
Parliamentarians:
The Supreme Court is the ultimate arbiter of legislation passed by
elected representatives. Thus, Parliamentarians (both federal and
provincial) must also firmly believe that those who will judge their
laws merit membership in the Court because of outstanding juristic
qualities rather than partisan affiliations or political viewpoints.
Provincial input is critical given that the Court rules on federalism
disputes between the federal government and provinces.
General Public:
The general public must also believe that appointments are made based
on merit and not simply to stack the Court to render decisions favourable
to a ruling government. To achieve this, some experts have suggested
that any system to choose judges for the Supreme Court of Canada should
include representatives of the "general public". While we
very much agree that the process must invoke confidence of the general
public, the BCCLA believes that this can be achieved without the inclusion
of laypersons in the selection process. It is not clear how one would
choose a layperson representative of the "general public".
Furthermore, without some special expertise relevant to the task of
selecting the best candidates, a layperson would contribute very little
to the process. Instead, we suggest that elected representatives are
able to represent the "general public" as they do with other
matters of public concern.
One of the principal
mechanisms by which democratic legitimacy can be achieved is by ensuring
that the process by which members of the Court are chosen is itself
legitimate. With increased focus on the current process, the relatively
secretive process is an easy target for criticism of political manipulation.
By making the process clear to all Canadians, these suspicions, whether
valid or unfounded, can not be substantiated.
Furthermore, by
making the process more inclusive, various interests will be able
to influence the outcome adding further legitimacy to the process.
A couple of further
comments regarding transparency are in order. First, greater transparency
will have the additional value of providing a valuable means to educate
the general public about the Court, its mandate, its operations and
about the people on the Court. Whatever reforms are made to the appointment
process, it would be an important advance to codify the process in
legislation such as the Supreme Court Act.
Second, a note
of caution is important. The nature of democratic legitimacy is by
necessity going to be different with respect to the appointment of
judges to the Supreme Court of Canada than it would be for the election
of elected representatives. They are fundamentally different positions
with different mandates and responsibilities and so the standards
and process for attaining office and accountability for elected representatives
will not be applicable to the standards for the appointment of judges.
Whereas complete transparency with respect to the election of legislative
representatives is paramount to the integrity of that branch of a
democratic system, a degree of significant confidentiality in the
assessment of candidates will likewise be paramount to the integrity
of appointments of the judiciary. Our third principle below provides
further explanation of why something less than full transparency is
appropriate for Court appointments.
3. The process
must be one that preserves the integrity of the Court while promoting
judicial independence and impartiality.
Judicial independence
and impartiality are fundamental conditions for a true democracy in
which the rule of law is an underlying principle. As Chief Justice
McLachlin stated in her address sponsored by the B.C. Civil Liberties
Association:
"...
judges are required by the most fundamental principles of our legal
tradition to remain independent and impartial. Judges are not beholden
to any particular interest or political party, much less to the prime
minister who may have appointed them. ... The suggestion that judges
ever disregard their obligation to rule in accordance with the law,
that they decide on the basis of their subjective preference, undermines
this confidence, and should not be made lightly. The suggestion that
judges are pawns in elaborate political games or serve the aims of
one side or the other of the political spectrum is equally destructive,
and equally false." 10
Thus, any process
for appointments to the Court must ensure that the conditions of judicial
independence and impartiality are sustained and protected.
But what do the
concepts of independence and impartiality represent and how are they
relevant in concrete terms to the Court's appointment process?
By way of background,
two decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada provide guidance. In
Valente, 11 the Court states that the purpose
of judicial independence is, among other things, to ensure that courts
can fulfil their fundamental responsibility as protectors "of
the Constitution and the fundamental values embodied in it -- rule
of law, fundamental justice, equality, preservation of the democratic
process, to name perhaps the most important." [at para.14] The
Court distinguishes impartiality from independence:
"A
judge may be impartial in the sense that he has no preconceived ideas
or bias, actual or perceived, without necessarily being independent.
... Although there is obviously a close relationship between independence
and impartiality, they are nevertheless separate and distinct values
or requirements. Impartiality refers to a state of mind or attitude
of the tribunal in relation to the issues and the parties in a particular
case. The word "impartial" as Howland C.J.O. noted, connotes
absence of bias, actual or perceived. The word "independent"
in s. 11(d) reflects or embodies the traditional constitutional
value of judicial independence. As such, it connotes not merely a
state of mind or attitude in the actual exercise of judicial functions,
but a status or relationship to others, particularly to the executive
branch of government, that rests on objective conditions or guarantees.
16
Fawcett, in The Application of the European Convention on Human
Rights (1969), p. 156, commenting on the requirement of an "independent
and impartial tribunal established by law" in article 6 of the
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, puts the distinction between independence and impartiality
as follows:
'The often fine distinction between independence and impartiality
turns mainly, it seems, on that between the status of the tribunal
determinable largely by objective tests and the subjective attitudes
of its members, lay or legal. Independence is primarily freedom from
control by, or subordination to, the executive power in the State;
impartiality is rather absence in the members of the tribunal of personal
interest in the issues to be determined by it, or some form of prejudice.'
17
The scope of the necessary status or relationship of independence
has been variously defined. For example, Shetreet, in Judges on
Trial: A Study of the Appointment and Accountability of the English
Judiciary (1976), emphasizes in the following passage at pp. 17-18
the importance of freedom from the influence of certain powerful non-governmental
interests:
'Independence of the judiciary has normally been thought of as freedom
from interference by the Executive or Legislature in the exercise
of the judicial fonction. This, for example, was the conception expressed
by the International Congress of Jurists at New Delhi in 1959 (The
Rule of Law in a Free Society, 11 (Report of the International Congress
of Jurists, New Delhi, 1959, prepared by N. S. Marsh)) and arises
from the fact that historically the independence of the judiciary
was endangered by parliaments and monarchs. In modern times, with
the steady growth of the corporate giants, it is of utmost importance
that the independence of the judiciary from business or corporate
interests should also be secured (Accord G. Borrie, Judicial Conflicts
of Interest in Britain, 18 Am. J. Comp. L. 697 (1970)). In short,
independence of the judiciary implies not only that a judge should
be free from governmental and political pressure and political entanglements
but also that he should be removed from financial or business entanglements
likely to affect, or rather to seem to affect, him in the exercise
of his judicial functions.'" [at paras. 14-17]
In
Re Remuneration of Judges (1997), 12 the Court reiterated
Valente's three core and necessary conditions required for judicial
independence: security of tenure (removal only for cause after a judicial
inquiry with an opportunity to be heard), financial security (freedom
from political interference through economic interference by legislature
or executive) and institutional independence (the freedom of judges
and courts to administer their judicial responsibilities without interference
from the executive or legislative branches of government or political
matters).
For the Court
in Re Remuneration of Judges, the separation of powers between
the legislative, executive and judicial branches of government that
exists in the Constitution of Canada is critical for ensuring judicial
independence and insulating the judiciary from political influence:
"What
is at issue here is the character of the relationships between the
legislature and the executive on the one hand, and the judiciary on
the other. These relationships should be depoliticized. When
I say that those relationships are depoliticized, I do not mean to
deny that they are political in the sense that court decisions (both
constitutional and non-constitutional) often have political implications,
and that the statutes which courts adjudicate upon emerge from the
political process. What I mean instead is the legislature and executive
cannot, and cannot appear to, exert political pressure on the judiciary,
and conversely, that members of the judiciary should exercise reserve
in speaking out publicly on issues of general public policy that are
or have the potential to come before the courts, that are the subject
of political debate, and which do not relate to the proper administration
of justice." [at para.140, Court's emphasis]
Thus, these principles
both provide fodder for a critique of the current system of Court
appointments - the fear that the Prime Minister could use his almost
complete discretionary authority for purely partisan and/or political
ends - and for guidance for the creation of a new appointment process.
In seeking to address at least the appearance of a potential problem
with the current system, it will be equally important to create a
process that respects the principle of "depoliticization".
V. Options for Reform
There are of course
endless possibilities for reform to the Court's current appointment
process. However, I will seek to limit the options to ones that have
been proposed by credible experts or interested persons who have some
influence in the efforts to reform the current process. In constructing
a model, it will again be important to address the three issues about
who will participate in the process, how will they go about their
responsibilities and what will be the basis or criteria by which they
make decisions. These issues will be discussed in each option. It
should also be noted that there will be a variety of combinations
and permutations within any particular option when mixing together
these three ingredients.
1). Enhanced Status
Quo
Many experts suggest
that the results of the current process demonstrate its strengths:
appointments to the Supreme Court of Canada have been consistently
top quality. Why mess with success? To address problems of transparency,
the "protocol" described by Irwin Cotler above could be
codified as part of the Supreme Court Act. This would shine some light
on the current process making it more transparent and thus legitimate.
However, both
the Prime Minister of Canada and the Minister of Justice have indicated
an intention to amend the current system to permit greater Parliamentary
participation in the appointment process. Whether or not the PM or
Minister will have the opportunity to honour this promise or will
in fact honour it if they have the power to do so, the principle of
democratic legitimacy would support greater Parliamentary (and provincial)
participation. In his address to the Justice Committee, Minister Cotler
suggested that there are three options open to the Committee for recommendation,
the first of which would permit parliamentary committee review of
a nomination proposed by the Minister of Justice by questioning the
Minister. Thus, the Minister would appear before a committee to essentially
defend the decision to nominate a particular person. The Minister
is not clear whether the committee or any other body would have to
ratify the decision, but given this option is essentially the status
quo with some enhancement, we will assume that there is no power of
ratification, simply the opportunity to explain the nomination and
answer questions. Thus, the Prime Minister (via the Cabinet) would
retain authority to make the appointment.
If one believes
that the current process should be continued, this option is a preferred
option. It will enhance the perceived legitimacy of the process both
by making it more transparent and increasing the participation of
Parliamentarians.
However, this
option can still be criticized as at least retaining one of the primary
weaknesses of the current system in that it locates all the power
to influence the Court through the appointment process by placing
appointments ultimately in the hands of one person C the Prime Minister.
The problem of politicization - real or perceived - is not addressed.
2.) Judicial Appointments
Committee or Commission
In this model,
also identified by Mr. Cotler, a judicial appointments committee or
commission would be assembled each time a new member to the Court
needs to be appointed. Ideally, this committee would include all the
groups listed in section IV who must maintain confidence in the appointments:
the judiciary itself, parliamentarians, the legal community and the
general public.
Though particular
individuals and groups disagree with respect to composition and mandate,
there is consistency among the proposals made to the Justice Committee
for the creation of an advisory committee to undertake the substantive
work of deciding who would be the best candidate for appointment to
the Court.
For example, Professors
Ziegel and Russell both favour a judicial selection committee that
would include federal parliamentarians, eminent members of the legal
community and the judiciary, provincial and territorial representation.
The committee would nominate someone after public hearings in which
candidates could be queried about their backgrounds and perspectives.
The Prime Minister would then be responsible for appointing based
on the committee's recommendations. 13
Drawing on the
current process for the appointment of superior court and Court of
Appeal justices under the Judges Act 14, the Canadian
Bar Association's (CBA) brief recommends that a Special Advisory Committee
be created when an appointment needs to be made. 15
This proposed committee would include representation from the federal
Minister of Justice, the Attorney(s) General, Chief Justice(s) and
law society(ies) of the province (or region) from which the appointment
is to be selected, national President of the CBA, and four Parliamentarians
elected from the Justice Committee. This committee would then make
recommendations for an appointment to the Prime Minister. The CBA
explicitly rejects the notion that candidates can be subject to public
or private interviews by a selection committee and suggests that such
hearings would undermine judicial independence.
Professor McCormick,
a Professor of Political Science at the University of Lethbridge recommended
to the Justice Committee that a federal judicial commission be created
comprising of five judges as selected by the Canadian Judicial Council,
five premiers selected by the premiers themselves and five members
of the Justice Committee selected to represent major political parties
in Parliament. Professor Morton endorsed Professor McCormick's model.
This appointment committee would recommend five individuals from which
the Prime Minister would pick one. Then the appointment designate
would be required to appear before the Justice Committee in televised
hearings to answer any and all questions posed by it.
A fourth option
as outlined by the Justice Committee in its recently released report
16 would create an advisory committee composed
of one representative of each political party with official standing
in the House of Commons, representatives from the provinces, members
of the judiciary, legal profession and lay members. The advisory committee
would compile a comprehensive list of potential candidates that it
would then work to reduce to three to five candidates based on consultations
and assessment currently described by the Minister of Justice, including
consultation with the Chief Justice of Canada to understand the needs
of the Court. The Advisory Committee would not interview candidates
and its work would be confidential. The advisory committee would make
its recommendations to the Minister of Justice. The final decision
would be left to the Minister and the Prime Minister. The choice would
be formalized through an Order in Council appointment. The chair of
the Advisory Committee and/or the Minister of Justice would appear
before the Justice Committee to explain the process and justify the
choice. Candidates would not be subject to American style confirmation
hearings. As an interim process, a majority of the Justice Committee
recommended that the Minister of Justice appear before the Committee
to report on the process and the reasons for appointing particular
people. The BCCLA is listed as having provided a brief. The only submission
the BCCLA made was a letter urging the Prime Minister, the Minister
of Justice and the Justice Committee to take its time and properly
consult in creating a new process. This is a message also delivered
by the Chief Justice of Canada and various witnesses before the Committee.
Common among all
of these proposals is that a select group of "experts" would
convene to undertake the task of determining, at a minimum, who are
the leading candidates or, at its most expansive, who should be chosen
as the best candidate. They differ in who should participate on such
a committee and, importantly, on whether candidates should be subject
to a public hearing.
How does one choose
individuals to sit on an advisory committee? Whatever the selection
process for members of an advisory committee, this process itself
must ensure that members are not picked based on partisan affiliations
(other than Parliamentarians) or to pursue partisan agendas. With
this caveat in mind, we would support a process in which a variety
of expert groups that are non-partisan should be left to choose the
best representative to participate on a committee. For example, with
respect to the judiciary, the Chief Justice of the provincial Court
of Appeal and superior court could directly participate or delegate
another judge to represent them. With respect to the legal community,
one member from the Canadian Bar Association and local law society(ies)
could name representatives. Parliamentarians would be represented
by individuals of both the government and official opposition from
the federal level and by government representatives at the provincial
level.
VI. The Mandate of an Advisory Committee and the Role of the Prime
Minister
Should an advisory
committee merely provide a short list of top candidates from which
the Prime Minister or Executive could choose or should the committee
pick the candidate? This question involves fairly complex considerations
about democracy and the nature of judicial review at the level of
the Supreme Court of Canada.
In considering
this question, it is important to acknowledge two important facts.
First, the decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada, prior to the
Charter but even more so after its creation, have an important
influence on public policy in Canada. Given the Court's significant
public policy role, why shouldn't the government of the day - which
is elected to govern based on certain public policy commitments -have
considerable influence on who is appointed to the Court?
Second, it is
important to acknowledge that judges are unique individuals with unique
perspectives about a judge's role and differing theories about judicial
interpretation and judicial review. Some judges may be seen as deferential
to government, while others more interventionist. Thus, it is possible
to have several top candidates who each are highly meritorious for
appointment based on the criteria that we have discussed earlier in
this paper yet will each bring a different approach to their judgements.
Is it appropriate to delegate the choice among equal but different
candidates to a committee of un-elected members? On what basis will
they make distinctions between candidates of equal but different merit?
If the difference between candidates is one of "judicial perspective",
isn't it more appropriate for elected, accountable officials to make
this choice than appointed members?
The concern about
both these propositions is that it takes us back to the arguments
we introduced earlier in this paper about politicization of the appointment
process and judiciary. There is a real tension between being careful
about not allowing a Prime Minister complete discretion to choose
whomever they wish without any constraints or safeguards for fear
of outright politicization of the process, on the one hand and acknowledging
on the other that (a) there may be a legitimate role for the Prime
Minister in choosing an appointment given the policy role of the Court
and (b) there has to be some basis -and some legitimate authority
- for distinguishing between otherwise equally meritorious candidates.
The resolution
to this tension could be found in distinguishing between the responsibility
of a true advisory committee and the ultimate decision making
responsibility for the Prime Minister, or Executive, with respect
to an appointment. The advisory committee's role would thus be to
determine the best leading candidates based on merit and to advise
the Prime Minister about each candidate's "judicial perspective"
(i.e. set of values regarding judicial interpretation). The advisory
committee would presumably eliminate those candidates who simply see
little or no role for judicial review - the worry expressed earlier
in this paper regarding those Court appointment reformists who have
little regard for the judicial branch of government. Yet, they would
presumably include candidates who, as long as they meet the other
merit criteria, are either "activist" or "deferential".
The advisory committee
would work on a consensus based model. All members of the committee
would have to agree on the recommendations for a short list submitted
to the Prime Minister. Because the advisory committee's mandate will
be to provide a short list of five or so top candidates all of whom
meet the minimum but high standards of merit - not to recommend only
one individual - consensus should not be difficult to achieve. The
advantage of a consensus model is that it encourages decision makers
to take seriously other interests besides their own, including partisan
interests if they have any, because they must agree to all candidates
on the short list. This is a further way the advisory committee will
not become a partisan tool thus promoting judicial independence and
impartiality.
From this short
list, the Prime Minister would then choose the appointment according
to his or her own views about the kind of judicial perspective they
wish to see added to the Court.
The advisory committee
should also include a chairperson who will have organizational support
to act as a secretariat to coordinate the operation of the committee.
We believe that the chairperson should be the Clerk of the Privy Council.
The Clerk and his staff's role is to provide non-partisan advice to
the Prime Minister and Cabinet. The Clerk of the Privy Council is
the head of the public service and responsible for smooth transitions
between different governments. 17
VII. Public Hearings
In considering
more carefully the idea of public hearings, it is not apparent what
such hearings would accomplish. An axiom of judicial decision making
is that a judge lets a decision she has written speak for itself.
Thus, it is not appropriate for parliamentarians to ask potential
candidates or a nominee to comment on a particular case. Nor would
a nominee answer such questions. Again, a nominee's theory of judicial
review should be evident by their past judgements. The only exception
would be for candidates who come directly from private practice (Justices
Binnie and Sopinka for example) or the academic world (Justice Bastarache),
but in each of these cases, such candidates will have likely written
or given public speeches on topics of interest to a selection committee.
Finally, it will not be appropriate for an MP to ask a nominee's personal
values with respect to controversial political issues that may come
before a court such as abortion or the death penalty nor would a nominee
answer such questions. Though a public hearing involving the Minister
of Justice and possibly the chair of a selection committee would not
create the problems as outlined above, again it is not clear what
is to be gained by this type of hearing in substantive terms since
they will not ask such questions of candidates. In sum, there is little
to be gained in substantive terms in determining the best candidate
to appoint to the Court through the use of public hearings. At best,
they provide a modicum of an appearance of "accountability"
with little if any substantive assistance to choosing the best candidate.
At worst they will provide a very public stage for politicians to
play politics with the appointment process, thus undermining judicial
independence and impartiality.
VIII. Liberal and Conservative Preferences
In May 17, 2004
editions of the Vancouver Sun and National Post, a spokesperson
for Prime Minster Martin has indicated that the Justice Committee's
recommendations do not go far enough to fulfill the PM's promise to
allow MPs greater ability to review and scrutinize appointments. The
Chair of the Justice Committee, Martin Lee suggested that his Committee
colleagues were "so cautious that they low-balled a potential
role for Parliament." Mr. Lee is now suggesting that Parliamentarians
could interview nominees in closed hearings with protocols to avoid
inappropriate questioning. The Prime Minister's spokesperson indicated
that the new process would be place by June to allow for it to be
used for the two new pending appointments to the Court, contrary to
the advice of many including the BCCLA.
Conservative Party
of Canada members of the Justice Committee wrote a dissenting report
implicitly recommending American style ratification hearings. Justice
critic Vic Toews has suggested that a Conservative government will
create an all-party committee to review nominations including public
hearings though the committee could not veto a Prime Minister's choice.
As noted previously,
the BCCLA has sent the Prime Minister and all party leaders a letter
indicating our opposition to open confirmation hearings.
IX. Conclusion
There are good
reasons in principle to reform the current process for appointments
to the Supreme Court of Canada. The current process lacks adequate
transparency, legitimacy and may threaten judicial independence and
impartiality because it could be subject to purely political manipulation.
Any reform must be based on three principles: appointment by merit,
democratic legitimacy and judicial independence/impartiality. Public
hearings involving the questioning of nominees to the Court may threaten
judicial independence/impartiality and thus should not be included
in an appointment process. Instead, an advisory or selection committee
should assess the merits of leading candidates and recommend a short
list of candidates to the Prime Minister who would make a final choice.
(1)
Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 4th ed. (looseleaf) (Toronto: Carswell,
1997) at 8-6, 8-7.
(2) For a weblink to the Minister=s submission, go to: http://www.parl.gc.ca/InfoCom/PubDocument.asp?DocumentID=1276991&Language=E
(3) Telephone correspondence with Marc Giroux, Judicial Affairs Advisor
to the Minister of Justice, April 28, 2004.
(4) In particular, see the testimony of Professor Jacob Ziegel (Faculty
of Law, University of Toronto) and Professor Peter Russell (Department
of Political Science, University of Toronto) to the Justice Committee,
March 23, 2004, online: http://www.parl.gc.ca/InfoCom/PubDocument.asp?DocumentID=1258204&Language=E
(5) News Hound, September 7, 2003 as cited in www.tranquileye.com/stockwell/harper.php
(6) Online: http://www.canlii.org/on/cas/onca/2003/2003onca10314.html
(7)
As reported in the Globe and Mail, June 3, 2004.
(8) These critics include Professor Ted Morton (Political Science, University
of Calgary), Professor Christopher Manfredi (Political Science, McGill
University) and Neil Seeman, of the Fraser Institute. Professor Morton
testified before the Justice Committee on April 1, 2004. Professor Manfredi
testified on March 23, 2004. To access their testimony, visit: http://www.parl.gc.ca/InfoCom/CommitteeMinute.asp?Language=E&Parliament=139&Joint=0&CommitteeID=8795
(9) See M. Mollard, Delivering Democracy C The Challenge of Judicial
Accountability (2004) 62 Advocate (B.C.) 337.
(10) B. McLachlin, Democracy, the Rule of Law and Judicial Activism,
online: <http://www.bccla.org/18NOVBCCLA(FINAL)21.pdf> at 20.
Given the timing of these comments coming two months or so after Stephen
Harper=s comments noted earlier in this paper, one may wonder if the
Chief Justice offers her comments as an indirect response to Mr. Harper.
(11)
[1985] 2 S.C.R. 673 at para. 14.
(12) [1997] 3 S.C.R. 3
(13) See Professor Ziegel=s and Russell=s testimony before the Justice
Committee.
(14) See Part III of the federal Judges Act. Also visit the website
of the Office of the Commissioner for Federal Judicial Affairs at: <http://www.fja.gc.ca/home/index_e.html>
for a complete description of judicial appointments for lower courts.
(15) The CBA brief also has short descriptions of appointment processes
in other countries. To view the CBA=s brief, visit: <http://www.cba.org/CBA/submissions/pdf/04?10?03?eng.pdf>
(16) To obtain a copy, visit: http://www.parl.gc.ca/InfocomDoc/Documents/37/3/parlbus/commbus/house/reports/justrp01/justrp01?e.pdf
(17) For more information about the Office of the Clerk of the Privy
Council, visit:
<http://www.pco-bcp.gc.ca/default.asp?Language=E&Page=aboutpco>
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