DISTINGUISHING
TERRORISM FROM OTHER TYPES OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE
November 29, 2001
John Russell
Is there a difference between militant civil unrest and terrorism?
This critically important question was not even posed, much less discussed,
in the now truncated debate surrounding the federal government’s
recent anti-terrorism proposals.
Why was a debate about the difference between terrorism and other types
of political violence such as militancy so important? Why have we not
had that debate? And what are the implications of not having it?
There is a simple reason these issues were overlooked. The roughness
of the original anti-terrorism proposals evidently reflected the haste
with which they were prepared after 9-11. But as a result, not only
did they fail to mark any distinction between terrorism and militancy,
they were so broadly conceived as to undermine the distinction between
terrorism and protest and dissent. In consequence, civil liberties advocates
naturally concentrated their lobbying on making sure that familiar and
unremarkable forms of political activity, such as nonviolent civil disobedience
and work stoppages, would not be cast as terrorism and, therefore, subject
to extraordinary new police powers.
The government has now made amendments that begin to address these concerns.
The political process is apparently over, and the new anti-terrorism
act (Bill C-36) seems set for implementation any time.
But in a way, the debate that took place was a diversion. For the use
of anti-terrorism measures against natives or environmentalists blockading
roads, or against doctors, nurses, teachers, or trade unionists whose
work stoppages threatened essential services, could not realistically
have taken place. Such actions would not have survived a Charter
challenge. Just as importantly, they would quickly have undermined the
legitimacy of the real anti-terrorist campaign by making victims of
Canadian citizens and drawing invidious comparisons with the perpetrators
of 9-11.
However, because of this diversion, we lost the opportunity to debate
a much more difficult and troubling issue. More specifically, we needed
to think about distinguishing terrorism from other forms of political
violence.
For example, should anti-terrorism measures, such as investigative hearings,
electronic surveillance without warrant, and preventive detention be
used against violent protestors who caused riots in places like Seattle
and Genoa? Should such measures be used against so-called eco-terrorists
who spike trees with the apparent aim of threatening serious injury,
and perhaps death, to loggers? Should animal rights activists be treated
as terrorists for poisoning Christmas turkeys or threatening animal
researchers’ lives?
By threatening serious bodily harm in order to achieve political objectives,
these activities all fall within the current definition of terrorism.
Moreover, there will be powerful incentives to use any special measures
that are available to deal with such activities, because they are dangerous
and because they rightly have little public support.
But the application of extraordinary anti-terrorism powers to these
sorts of activities must be resisted. Such acts are certainly heinous
and criminal and not to be tolerated. But it is a perilous exaggeration
to describe them as terrorist, and thus on a par with the sorts of terrorist
activity to which this legislation is a response.
Indeed, counting as terrorists some of the more radical environmentalists,
animal rights activists, anarchist hoodlums, and their ilk needlessly
multiplies the number of terrorists on the ground in Canada. Among other
things, this would distract from our efforts to detect and bring to
justice the real terrorists. It will inevitably place the activities
of legitimate protest groups under extraordinary, close government scrutiny.
This is bound to have a chilling effect on those groups’ activities
and raise questions about the legitimacy of the campaign against terror.
Most disturbingly, it may well push militants over the edge into real
terrorism, as has happened in other countries.
We must also remember that the current legislation was not prompted
by the need to address such problems, which have been adequately handled
with existing law enforcement measures. Moreover, there are ways in
which these actions are typically qualitatively different from terrorism.
And so some rough, but useful, distinctions can be drawn.
Specifically, the aim of terrorism is typically to terrorize generally
by visiting grievous violence indiscriminately and without warning.
As a result, it frequently targets innocents rather than parties directly
responsible for disputes.
By contrast, tree spikers and some radical animal rights activists are
different. They issue public warnings to attempt to ensure that harm
can be effectively prevented, not caused. They aim to intimidate. But
their aim is not to terrorize and undermine a sense of security in the
community (as if a bomb could go off on any street at any time).
But sometimes terrorists’ actions are discriminating in who they
target, or they issue warnings too. As a result, definitions of terrorism
do not, and perhaps cannot, exclude militant-type behaviour.
The problem of drawing these distinctions is therefore not likely to
be solved by fine tuning wording in legislation. This is why it was
so important to have had a public debate on this issue, which could
at least have informed and guided public officials about the dangers
and appropriate limits of applying an overbroad definition of terrorism.
For these reasons, it is especially important that public debate and
scrutiny of the anti-terrorism legislation not stop with its enactment.
J.S. Russell teaches
philosophy at the University of British Columbia. He gave testimony
on Bill C-36 to the Justice Committee on behalf of the B.C. Civil Liberties
Association.
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