2 1 COLONEL STEVEN NOONAN, SWORN: 2 EXAMINATION BY MR. CHAMP: 3 MR. CHAMP: Good afternoon, Colonel Noonan. 4 THE WITNESS: Good afternoon. 5 MR. CHAMP: Thanks for making yourself available 6 for us this afternoon. 7 MR. GRAHAM: Counsel, before we begin I have an 8 amendment to make with respect to the affidavit. If I 9 could ask you to turn to paragraph 54 on page 14? As of 10 the date of swearing of the affidavit that statement was 11 true. The Canadian Forces have since detained persons. 12 They have since determined those persons are not a 13 security threat and they are in the process of being 14 released. That's all I can say on that issue. 15 BY MR. CHAMP: 16 1. Q. Colonel Noonan, I understand that you were 17 commander of Task Force Afghanistan for about eight 18 months, nine months? 19 A. From August '05 to March '06. 20 2. Q. Now you are commander of CEFCOM? 21 A. No. I am a staff officer, J3, head of the 22 operations branch for Canadian Expeditionary Force Command 23 or CEFCOM. 24 3. Q. Who is the commander of CEFCOM? 25 A. The commander is Lieutenant General Gauthier. 3 1 4. Q. Colonel Noonan, we're here today to talk a 2 little bit about detainees or individuals that the 3 Canadian Forces have detained in Afghanistan. The first 4 question I would like to ask you, sir, is about who are 5 the people the Canadian Forces are detaining. It's my 6 understanding from documents that I've seen that it's not 7 simply people who are engaged in combat but it's other 8 individuals, a wide spectrum of individuals that the 9 Canadian Forces may detain if for some reason they think 10 there are other reasons that they might be suspicious. 11 A. The people that we detain are those people 12 that we consider to be a threat to the local security at 13 the time. 14 5. Q. That would include some people who are not 15 engaged in combat? 16 A. That's correct. 17 6. Q. Sometimes people will just be in an area where 18 Canadian Forces feel they shouldn't be or are suspicious 19 if there are any individuals in that area and stop them, 20 question them, and then just based on the questioning or 21 perhaps a search they think it's appropriate to detain 22 them? 23 A. They will have either committed an act or 24 indicated an intent or will have been acting suspicious 25 enough that we would want to ascertain why they're acting 4 1 in such a manner. 2 7. Q. Those would be people that you would detain? 3 A. They aren't detained at that particular point. 4 They are asked questions to determine if they are a threat 5 at that particular point to confirm whether they are or 6 not. 7 8. Q. And searched? 8 A. If it is considered that the risk is such that 9 it needs to be further mitigated, they can be searched and 10 restrained if required. 11 9. Q. What are some of the reasons or grounds that 12 would lead them to be detained after a search? 13 A. Just to be clear, after a search? 14 10. Q. Following a search what would lead the 15 individual to be detained? What are some examples? 16 A. Just to clarify some of the points perhaps in 17 the affidavit in terms of the process, when a person is in 18 circumstances under which there is suspicion that he or 19 she may be a threat to the security they are stopped and 20 if after questioning it is determined that there is 21 grounds on which that suspicion needs to be further 22 investigated, they will be searched. As I said before, if 23 they are acting in such a manner that requires it, they 24 will be restrained and then they will further be handled 25 to determine whether they are considered to be a continued 5 1 threat. Some of the indications can be location of where 2 they are. 3 11. Q. Colonel Noonan, you're aware of complaints to 4 the Military Police Complaints Commission concerning 5 handling of detainees? 6 A. Yes, I am. 7 12. Q. I'm handing you and your counsel a document of 8 two witness statements that are documents in the 9 possession of the Military Police Complaints Commission in 10 connection with the Attaran complaint. These witness 11 statements were disclosed to Professor Attaran pursuant to 12 the Access to Information and as I understand it they are 13 witness statements of the Canadian Forces personnel who 14 captured one of those individuals. 15 Colonel Noonan, I'm just going to ask you just the 16 format of that document, does the format of that document 17 look familiar to you? 18 A. Yes. 19 13. Q. It's Annex E to TSO or theatre standing order, 20 I gather? 21 A. Yes. 22 14. Q. Can you just explain what the purpose of this 23 form is? 24 A. As part of the detainee process? 25 15. Q. Yes. 6 1 A. It is outlined in the affidavit. There are a 2 couple of procedures that we -- part of the process of 3 handling detainees in a manner that we can ascertain the 4 threat or can catalogue what actions we've taken with the 5 detainee throughout that process. We use this particular 6 form as part of our cataloguing process of activities that 7 have been conducted. 8 16. Q. It's my understanding the purpose is to 9 catalogue the reasons or ground for the initial detention. 10 A. It could be and it is also used as what 11 actions were conducted during that process. 12 17. Q. Have you ever had an opportunity to see these 13 documents before? 14 A. This particular one, no. 15 18. Q. Can you just review the documents for a 16 moment? In these two different witness statements of the 17 same incident it's my understanding that it's an 18 individual who was in the wrong area. He was stopped as 19 he appeared to be observing CF activity. He was later 20 captured again and found to have a cell phone and a 21 mirror. From the details that are in this document what 22 would your view be why the members in questions detained 23 this individual? 24 MR. GRAHAM: Don't answer that question. It calls 25 for speculation. *O* 7 1 BY MR. CHAMP: 2 19. Q. As commander of Task Force Afghanistan you 3 would be providing direction and control to the soldiers 4 in the field? 5 A. When I was there, yes. 6 20. Q. They would be looking ultimately to your 7 command and direction with respect to detention and 8 capture of individuals? 9 A. I was part of that overall direction that was 10 provided to soldiers on the ground at that time, yes. 11 21. Q. You would be in discussions with your 12 subordinates about the reasons why individuals would be 13 detained? 14 A. Yes. 15 22. Q. In fact, Colonel Noonan, when there's a 16 determination about whether to release or to transfer 17 someone to Afghan authorities you were the responsible 18 officer to make that decision? Isn't that so? 19 A. That's correct. 20 23. Q. You would look at documents like this, I 21 understand, to make that kind of determination? 22 A. That's correct. 23 24. Q. You would review the information that you had 24 on hand to then come to a conclusion whether the person 25 gave you personally a reasonable belief that he or she may 8 1 be a person who should be detained further and 2 transferred? 3 A. That's correct. 4 25. Q. In that capacity what are some of the things 5 in these documents that would lead you to believe this 6 person should be further detained? 7 MR. GRAHAM: I object. Again this calls for 8 speculation. This witness has said he hasn't seen the 9 documents before. He doesn't know the facts of these 10 cases. You're asking him to speculate as to whether or 11 not a case for release or further detention has been made 12 out. *O* 13 BY MR. CHAMP: 14 26. Q. What are the sort of things that you look for, 15 Colonel Noonan, to determine whether a case has been made 16 for detention or release? For someone who hasn't been 17 involved in combat per se, what are some of the things 18 that you would look for in that role? 19 A. When I was there? 20 27. Q. Yes. 21 A. I think we need to be clear when I was there 22 we did not detain in the same context that we are 23 detaining right now. We are part of a transition from 24 Kabul to Kandahar. The circumstances under which 25 detention would occur under my command were different. 9 1 The process under which we were to process any potential 2 detainees was different. 3 28. Q. In what way? 4 A. The threat under which we were operating was 5 not characterised the same. The chain of command and 6 force structure within which we operated was not the same. 7 29. Q. But you did sit in that position and did make 8 determinations a number of times about whether to detain 9 or transfer? 10 A. I didn't make determinations on detainees 11 except in three cases. 12 30. Q. Colonel Noonan, I would like to ask you some 13 questions about a few Canadian Forces military documents. 14 They are documents in your affidavit. They are documents 15 in the affidavit of Yavar Hameed. The volume I would like 16 to take you to is Volume II. At Exhibit R there is the 17 Canadian Forces Military Police Doctrine. Are you 18 familiar with that document? Have you seen it before? 19 A. I have not read that particular document in 20 detail. 21 31. Q. I just want to take you to a passage here. Go 22 to the table of contents and then it's about eight pages 23 in. It starts with "Chapter Five, Detention Operations." 24 Paragraph 2 says the following, 25 "Defeating the enemy without rounds fired, 10 1 injuries, or single death is the ultimate success a 2 commander can hope to achieve but this is unlikely. If 3 prisoners of war are treated in accordance with the Geneva 4 Conventions, they may find their living conditions 5 superior to those offered by their own units. Coalition 6 forces during the Gulf War of 1990 found enemy soldiers 7 were happy to be captured and to obtain the basic 8 necessities of life after extended periods of poor living 9 conditions. The end results were favourable to the allies 10 in many ways, fewer casualties on both sides and the 11 garnering of excellent public opinion. Mistreatment of 12 prisoners of war is militarily unwise, illegal, inhumane, 13 and immoral." 14 Colonel, I just want to ask you a question about 15 the issue of the military wisdom of handling detainees 16 humanely. It's my understanding from this that if 17 military units are capturing prisoners and treat them in a 18 humane manner and it becomes known among the enemy that 19 this is going to happen, it may well reduce the risk 20 militarily of prolonged combat because people would be 21 more inclined to surrender in those circumstances. Would 22 you agree with that? 23 A. In the context of Afghanistan we use the term 24 prisoners of war to describe the level of treatment that 25 we would like to accord the detainees, the persons that we 11 1 detain. The people that we detain in Afghanistan are not 2 prisoners of war. 3 32. Q. But there's a reason why, I understand, that 4 we treat them to the same standard of prisoners of war is 5 because we think that might be militarily wise in some way 6 among other reasons, that they might be more inclined to 7 surrender if they know they're going to be treated to the 8 highest standard possible? 9 A. It is certainly my belief that the reason why 10 treatment of them to the same, the detainees in 11 Afghanistan to the same levels of POWs is that it is one 12 of the recognised international standards to which we 13 should treat our detainees. 14 33. Q. Would you agree with that military argument 15 that it is militarily wise to do so? 16 A. As in most things that are based on tactics, 17 tactics are about principles and there's a level of 18 agreement and a level of disagreement at any one point 19 that is in the commander's prerogative of how he wants to 20 prosecute any given action. 21 34. Q. As a general principle, Colonel, you would 22 agree that treating detainees to the highest standard is 23 militarily wise because it may lead them to surrender more 24 easily? 25 MR. GRAHAM: The witness has said that it's a 12 1 matter of discretion for the commander depending upon the 2 circumstances. 3 MR. CHAMP: I don't think he answered my question. 4 That's why I'm asking it again. 5 THE WITNESS: I would agree that it is one of the 6 factors on which you would base the determination of the 7 standard that you would provide them. The overriding 8 factor is that as military commanders, they're still 9 humans and you treat detainees in a humane fashion as is 10 dictated by international law. 11 BY MR. CHAMP: 12 35. Q. That's ethical? 13 A. Right. 14 36. Q. That's why this statement says "Mistreatment 15 of prisoners of war is militarily unwise, illegal, 16 inhumane, and immoral"? There's a difference between 17 morality and legality obviously. Canadians are proud of 18 our Canadian Forces without question. We adhere to that 19 highest standard but there are other military pragmatic 20 reasons why it can be wise as well. That's what I'm 21 suggesting to you. 22 A. And there are reasons why the optionality 23 needs to be there because it's about discretion at the 24 tactical level. 25 37. Q. Would you say that the converse is true, if a 13 1 military force abused or tortured a prisoner, that the 2 enemy on the other side may fight more fiercely? 3 A. Again it's not a speculation in the legal 4 sense. It depends on the enemy. It's also speculation 5 because Canadian Forces soldiers wouldn't do that. 6 38. Q. Of course. 7 A. So I'm not understanding why we're --- 8 39. Q. I'm just asking you as military doctrine and 9 sort of general principles of warfare, things that you've 10 been trained in I imagine over the years. 11 A. I suppose we're probably getting into too fine 12 a level of detail but if we bring it back to the 13 principles of use of minimum force and proportionality, 14 the optionality that is presented to us in any armed 15 conflict of capture, kill, or be kill is the three 16 outcomes that we have when we're engaged in armed 17 conflict. Optionality presented to us of killing or 18 capturing provides us a modicum of possibility of success. 19 We need that optionality. 20 40. Q. The optionality to --- 21 A. Capture or kill. 22 41. Q. That's not the question I was asking you. I 23 was asking you about military warfare principles in 24 general and I was suggesting to you that a military force 25 that mistreats detainees may encounter military problems 14 1 from doing so. 2 MR. GRAHAM: And the witness has said that the 3 Canadian Forces wouldn't do that so he couldn't speculate 4 on it. 5 MR. CHAMP: That's not the question I was asking 6 him. I was asking him based on his training whether he 7 can speak to that. 8 THE WITNESS: As a proponent of someone that 9 agrees that you don't mistreat detainees -- I'm just 10 trying to answer your question in a fair manner --- 11 MR. CHAMP: I'm glad to hear that. 12 BY MR. CHAMP: 13 42. Q. Colonel Noonan, let's take it out of this 14 circumstance. If Taliban or Al-Quaida combatants know 15 that if they are captured by Canadian Forces they are 16 going to be transferred to those who will torture them, 17 that may cause those combatants to fight more fiercely. 18 Would you agree with that proposition? 19 A. I can't speculate on the Taliban except to 20 tell you how I can characterise what they would do. They 21 don't capture people. If they do, it's not capture. It's 22 taking hostage. That is the nature of the enemy that 23 we're combating. To what end they fight, to what degree 24 they fight, it has -- they will only fight when they have 25 tactical advantage. To what degree and what factors they 15 1 will assess in their own minds at any given time would be 2 their subsequent treatment after capture would be one of 3 their factors which I believe answers both your questions. 4 43. Q. I'll take you now to your affidavit, sir. At 5 paragraph 23 of your affidavit you speak to the command of 6 Canadian Forces and the control of Canadian Forces. Can 7 you describe the difference you mean between command and 8 control? 9 A. Operational control allows a superior 10 headquarters to assign tasks to a subordinate headquarters 11 or to a subordinate unit or formation but it does not 12 allow them to break up that subordinate force in any 13 discrete parts to do any discrete taskings. Operational 14 command allows for missions to be given to any subordinate 15 force and allows the break up of that force to achieve 16 discrete missions and tasks. 17 44. Q. So if I can paraphrase what you're saying, 18 operational control means assigning a task and operational 19 command is how you perform the task? 20 A. No. A mission is executed in a sequence of 21 tasks so operational control allows the assignment of 22 tasks to certain formations. It doesn't allow them to 23 change the mission. Operational command, you can change 24 the mission and you can change the force structure of that 25 subordinate command. 16 1 45. Q. Operational control allows to assign tasks and 2 operational command determines how the task is carried 3 out? Is that fair? 4 A. I suppose an example is probably the best way 5 of doing it and an example of Afghanistan. 6 46. Q. Sure. 7 A. Operational command is retained by national 8 authorities and operational control is given to ISAF which 9 is the formation through which NATO is exercising the 10 conduct of the tasks in Afghanistan. As we place our 11 forces under operational control of NATO we have come to 12 an agreement with NATO that the mission in Afghanistan is 13 congruent with Canadian aims and that NATO can assign 14 tasks to our forces in Afghanistan in the attainment of 15 that mission, however, that national command overrides 16 that and therefore the duties that are assigned to the 17 Canadian Forces ISAF personnel in Afghanistan need to 18 remain consistent with our direction, Canadian direction, 19 so therefore we always hold the ability to say no to 20 military tasks. 21 47. Q. From that I understand that Canadian Forces 22 aren't bound by ISAF policy. In other words, Canadian 23 command could override ISAF policy? 24 A. Once we've entered into an agreement with ISAF 25 policy we are bound by that policy. In the execution of 17 1 mission, we'll act within that policy. 2 48. Q. I take it we would have the right to give 3 notice to ISAF that we're not following a particular 4 policy any more? 5 A. Yes, and then there would be a requirement to 6 gain a convergence again so that operating within the 7 coalition, both parties, both national interests and NATO 8 interests converge again, so it's in agreement again. 9 49. Q. With respect to the 96-hour detention policy 10 of ISAF you would agree with me that it is possible for 11 Canadian Forces to hold beyond 96 hours? There are 12 circumstances when we've done that? 13 A. Could I just refresh myself where I said it's 14 96 hours? 15 50. Q. It's in paragraph 41. At anytime, Colonel, 16 take your time. If you want to stop and review things, 17 that's perfectly fine. 18 A. The ISAF policy is one that is, just to give 19 the framework within which is operates, the 96 hours is 20 one that nations have agreed to as being a reasonable 21 amount of time for us to be able to determine whether to 22 release or to transfer. 23 51. Q. But it is possible in certain circumstances 24 for us to hold longer than 96 hours? 25 A. Yes, if the case is made that there is a 18 1 requirement to do so. 2 52. Q. That determination would be made by the 3 commander of Task Force Afghanistan? 4 A. In concert with commander ISAF. 5 53. Q. You would advise ISAF but would not take 6 orders from ISAF on that issue, would he? 7 A. He would certainly take into account ISAF's 8 point of view. Just from historical purposes we have had 9 detainees that were detained beyond the 96-hour time frame 10 but for medical reasons. One of the main determinants of 11 when we hand over detainees to Afghan authorities is that 12 they are in good enough physical condition that this 13 transfer can be effected. 14 54. Q. Do we have any reporting obligation to ISAF in 15 those circumstances? 16 A. We do do that reporting to ISAF through 17 regional command south and to national authorities in 18 CEFCOM. I don't know if we have an obligation. It is 19 practised though that we do inform them that we are 20 keeping beyond 96 for the following reasons, et cetera. 21 55. Q. If I take you to Exhibit G of your affidavit, 22 you call these detainee handling deck cards or something. 23 They're --- 24 A. The slide deck. 25 56. Q. If you go to page 583, the top right corner, 19 1 at the top there's a flow chart Detainee Handling Detainee 2 Procedural Framework and I note that it flows down and in 3 the middle if you decide to detain ANSF, Afghan National 4 Security Force, is present on the object of a TFA. If 5 it's yes, there's a few things you do. If it's no, then 6 TFA, Task Force Afghanistan, notifies CEFCOM? 7 A. Yes. 8 57. Q. Then I note in the lower right-hand corner 9 that when it comes time for us to transfer an individual 10 to Afghan government custody following detention the 11 Government of Canada notifies the ICRC. I didn't see 12 anything in there that says that we notify ISAF. 13 A. It's not explicit there. It's certainly 14 practised though. 15 58. Q. Incidently while we're on it I also note that 16 if you go to the middle box where it's "detain" on its own 17 and then the next box says "Our Afghan National Security 18 Force is present on the objective with TFA." That's if 19 they're in the field with them, I gather? 20 A. Yes. 21 59. Q. If that's a yes then it goes to the next box 22 where it says "Is the Afghan Security Force capable or 23 willing to take immediate possession of individual in 24 question?" That would be like a battlefield transfer? 25 A. That's one of the examples, yes. 20 1 60. Q. If it's yes then arrange his immediate 2 transfer. In those circumstances ICRC is not notified is 3 my understanding. 4 A. No, they are. If we have detained them and we 5 have handed them over to ANSF, ICRC is informed of that 6 because it is a transfer of our detention to them. 7 61. Q. The way I was reading it is that if it's in 8 the field and it's so quickly after the battle there is no 9 notification of the ICRC just because I don't see any 10 arrow there to where we notify ICRC. It's only if the 11 ANSF is not willing to detain them in the field we then 12 take them out and that's when we go through our more 13 formal detainee processing chain. 14 A. No. If we have detained them as Canadian 15 Forces detainees and we hand them over to the ANSF, even 16 on the battlefield, we will complete the administrative 17 process through what is called the Annex F which is the 18 Notice of Transfer and ICRC will be informed . 19 62. Q. Colonel Noonan, I read your affidavit. Would 20 you agree with me that the capacity for humane treatment 21 and detention of prisoners is a necessary corollary of 22 combat operations? 23 A. I don't understand the question. 24 63. Q. That being able to provide humane treatment to 25 detainees is necessary if you're going to engage in combat 21 1 operations? 2 A. It's whatever has been agreed to as to the 3 process. We would have the necessary facilities to do 4 that. 5 64. Q. What I'm suggesting to you is it's a necessary 6 part of the mission. For example if you're going to send 7 off a unit of 100 soldiers, you've got to have someone 8 there who can cook and by the same token if 100 soldiers 9 are going out on a combat operation where it's expected 10 they may capture and detain an individual, it should be 11 expected that we have the capacity to hold that individual 12 in a humane manner? 13 A. To process that individual. We have to have 14 the capacity to process that individual in whatever manner 15 that that theatre of operations is mandated to do. 16 65. Q. So you have to have some provision for long- 17 term detention? 18 A. No. We have to have provision for the 19 processing of detainees in whatever theatre that we go to. 20 In Afghanistan the provision was that we would transfer 21 our detainees to Afghan authorities within 96 hours or as 22 soon as practical. 23 66. Q. Let me put it another way. Let's say that the 24 Afghan authorities and the American authorities refused to 25 take any detainees from Canadian soldiers for whatever 22 1 reason. Then we would no longer be able to engage in 2 combat operations, I take it? 3 MR. GRAHAM: This is a matter of speculation. *O* 4 THE WITNESS: That's the speculation part. It 5 would have an impact. 6 BY MR. CHAMP: 7 67. Q. It's important? Well, sir, let's go to your 8 affidavit then. Paragraph 29 of your affidavit says the 9 following, "Detention is integral to the broad spectrum of 10 CF operations including combat. Not having the option to 11 capture the enemy is not an acceptable or appropriate 12 military solution." 13 A. That's correct. 14 68. Q. You swore to that and that's true? 15 A. Yes. 16 69. Q. In other words, if we do not have the option 17 of capturing the enemy, we cannot engage in combat 18 operations, correct? 19 A. That's correct. 20 70. Q. So if we do not have the capacity to hold 21 someone then we cannot engage in military operations? 22 A. It doesn't necessarily follow. 23 71. Q. What would we do with them? 24 A. Again it's speculation because in the theatre 25 of operations that we have agreed to conduct operations in 23 1 there is the ability to detain and a process by which we 2 transfer these detainees to the Afghan government so we 3 have set up the necessary facilities that is required to 4 do that and assigned appropriate resources. 5 72. Q. We've been in Afghanistan now for over five 6 years, Colonel? 7 A. Off and on. We had an initial commitment 8 under Operation Apollo. That stopped. That was 2002 and 9 then we re-engaged in Afghanistan in 2003 under Operation 10 Athena. 11 MR. GRAHAM: There was a break of about three 12 months or so. 13 THE WITNESS: I can't remember the exact dates but 14 there was a break. 15 BY MR. CHAMP: 16 73. Q. Since January 2002 Canadian soldiers have been 17 in Afghanistan almost the entire time with the exception 18 of a few months? 19 A. With that exception. 20 74. Q. Throughout that time have we considered 21 developing the capacity to hold detainees ourselves? 22 A. We have not had to, no, because of the 23 arrangements that have been made. 24 75. Q. We've never considered the option? 25 A. We've never had to consider the option. 24 1 76. Q. We've never discussed it? 2 A. I wouldn't be able to say that. 3 77. Q. We do have plans for building long-term 4 detention facilities, do we not, Colonel? 5 A. A plan? 6 78. Q. In Prisoner of War and Detainee Doctrine, the 7 Canadian Forces, we have plans for building and staffing 8 and managing a prisoner of war or detainee holding 9 facility? 10 A. It's not a plan. It's an approach to 11 establishing a prisoner of war camp. 12 79. Q. It's plans if we wanted to establish one, 13 correct? 14 A. I suppose it can be characterised as a plan to 15 establish a prisoner of war camp. 16 MR. GRAHAM: Are you referring to a document in 17 particular? 18 MR. CHAMP: Yes. If you go to Volume II of the 19 affidavit of Yavar Hameed and you go to Exhibit Q, it's 20 the --- 21 MR. GRAHAM: I'm looking at a document entitled 22 Prisoner of War Handling Detainees and Interrogation and 23 Tactical Questioning. 24 MR. CHAMP: In International Operations, Joint 25 Doctrine Manual. 25 1 MR. GRAHAM: Yes. 2 BY MR. CHAMP: 3 80. Q. So you're familiar with that document, sir? 4 A. Not in detail but I'm familiar with it. 5 81. Q. If you go to page 3E6, it starts with a 6 chapter about the prisoners of war camp, all the 7 construction requirements set out in this annex for the PW 8 holding area and the layout of the compounds enclosures of 9 which it is made up also apply to the establishment of a 10 PW camp. The essential difference between the holding 11 area and the camp is the permanence of the camp whereas 12 the holding area is at best a semi-permanent facility. 13 The camp is a long-term facility implying the provision of 14 hutted accommodation, paved road, and paths and generally 15 solid construction methods for perimeter, fences, guard 16 towers, administrative offices. 17 From that passage, Colonel Noonan, you would agree 18 with me that the Canadian Forces do have plans for 19 establishing long-term detention facilities if necessary? 20 A. For prisoners of war. Although we treat our 21 detainees humanely or in terms of humanity, to the 22 conditions of prisoners of war, they're not prisoners of 23 war. 24 82. Q. Treatment to the standard of prisoners of war 25 except for living accommodations? 26 1 A. No, that's not what I was saying. There's no 2 legal basis on which we take these detainees as prisoners 3 of war. The concept of prisoners of war is take 4 combatants out until such time as the conflict is ceased 5 and it is part of an international armed conflict. 6 Detainees, we have been given permission by a recognised 7 government to establish a security situation to assist 8 them establishing a security situation that will allow 9 reconstruction and development, and in conjunction with 10 that government and in conjunction with our partners have 11 entered into an agreement of how we are going to handle 12 the capture of threat. 13 83. Q. You're speaking about Afghanistan? 14 A. Yes. 15 84. Q. What I draw from your answer relative to my 16 question is what you are saying is that Canada cannot 17 establish a prisoner of war camp in Afghanistan because we 18 have a different relationship with the Afghanistan 19 government than if it were an international conflict? 20 It's not an international conflict therefore we can't 21 create a prisoner of war camp? Is that what you're 22 saying? 23 A. No. The nature of the conflict is such that 24 although we apply some principles of the prisoners of war 25 to the treatment levels of detainees, that they're not 27 1 prisoners of war. The plan that you're alluding to here 2 is a bricks and mortar plan and doesn't provide any 3 context as to why that facility would be established, to 4 what level of security that that facility would have to be 5 manned and under what mandate that it would be 6 established. 7 85. Q. Colonel Noonan, you may want some time to 8 review this document because some of the things you're 9 saying aren't consistent with what the document is saying. 10 First of all it's not necessarily a bricks and mortar. 11 There's a few different camps here. They have ones for 12 small if you want to hold I believe it's 20 men is the 13 first one. The next one is 200. The next one is 500 and 14 the next one 2,000. They also have in there staffing, the 15 staffing ratios that were required for the different sized 16 of camps. Are you telling me, Colonel, that you didn't 17 have an opportunity to review this when you testified that 18 Canada did not have the capacity to build a detainee 19 facility in Afghanistan? 20 A. No. I'm aware of most of the contents of 21 this. These are plans that if we went into a conflict 22 where prisoners of war were taken, these are the types of 23 things that we could do. It was a doctrinal basis on 24 which we would prosecute prisoners of war in an armed 25 conflict. It identifies the resource requirement that 28 1 could be used in a prisoner of war. 2 86. Q. If we had to in an international conflict? 3 A. If we had to hold prisoners of war, yes. 4 87. Q. It's my understanding that soldiers and 5 military police do get training in how to establish these 6 facilities. That's true? 7 A. They do get training to some degree in that. 8 I'm not the expert on to what level they get that 9 training. 10 88. Q. Colonel, it's likely that Canadian Forces will 11 detain individuals in Afghanistan in the future? 12 A. Under the current mission set, yes. 13 89. Q. In the next six months how many detainees do 14 you think we might capture in a ball park? 15 A. That's speculative. I don't have that number. 16 90. Q. There's not operational plan or consideration 17 of that issue of how many it might be? 18 A. No. 19 91. Q. Paragraph 52 of your affidavit you state that 20 "Due to operational security I cannot release the numbers 21 of detainees, however, I can confirm they are higher than 22 that alleged in the applicants' affidavits." 23 A. Right, which is in the past. 24 92. Q. I think we suggested that it was at least 40 25 up to April '07 and there's probably more since then and 29 1 you're saying it's more than 40? Is that right? 2 A. I'm trying to be helpful here. The numbers of 3 detainees since we've been in Afghanistan is more than 40. 4 93. Q. Is it less than 200? 5 MR. GRAHAM: I object to the question. *O* 6 MR. CHAMP: He's already given an estimate, Mr. 7 Graham. I'm not asking for a specific number. 8 MR. GRAHAM: I object. 9 BY MR. CHAMP: 10 94. Q. Is it more than 1,000? 11 MR. GRAHAM: He's given his evidence. He can 12 confirm they're higher than that alleged in your 13 affidavits. 14 MR. CHAMP: You can't put in a little bit and then 15 claim privilege or national security. 16 MR. GRAHAM: I am claiming privilege. I am 17 claiming national security with respect to those figures. *O* 18 BY MR. CHAMP: 19 95. Q. Colonel Noonan, your position at CEFCOM, you 20 would get or see reports when people are detained? 21 A. I will see reports of people that are detained 22 if I ask for them or if they are flagged to me. 23 96. Q. Colonel Noonan, there's no requirement or 24 restriction in our agreements with Afghanistan that limits 25 how long we can detain Afghanistan citizens? Is that 30 1 true? 2 A. I'm sorry. I didn't understand. 3 97. Q. There's nothing in any of the agreements that 4 Canada has with Afghanistan that limits the duration of 5 time that we hold Afghan citizens? 6 A. The limitation that I'm aware of is the 96- 7 hour ISAF construct. 8 98. Q. I just want to ask you a bit about what you 9 might know about detention by Afghan authorities. In 10 paragraph 53 of your affidavit you say that "From March 11 2006 to the date of swearing this affidavit Canadian 12 Forces transferred increasingly to the NDS," the National 13 Directorate of Security, "as a result of increased 14 confidence in the professionalism of that organisation." 15 It's my understanding that the majority of our 16 detainees are now transferred to the NDS? 17 A. That has been the tendency, yes. 18 99. Q. How were the other branches of the Afghan 19 National Security Forces regarded as less professional 20 than NDS? 21 A. Only on a case-by-case basis. You'll see in 22 the other parts of the affidavit where there's a couple of 23 examples where some of the other ANS forces have shown 24 instances where we weren't as comfortable and so over a 25 period of time and by the conduct of, and this is again 31 1 I've been informed by other members of the Canadian 2 Forces, that over a period of time based on their 3 impression of the conduct of the NDS personnel that they 4 interact with they've grown comfortable that the NDS had 5 the professionalism required to receive our transferred 6 detainees. 7 100. Q. Meaning there would be fewer instances with 8 the NDS? 9 A. No. That would suppose that we knew that 10 anything was happening. Fewer, more, less, more chance 11 of, less likelihood of, just that we were comfortable that 12 this was an organisation that we were comfortable with. 13 101. Q. You had indicated that some other forces had 14 shown instances where you were not as comfortable but I 15 gather then the NDS had fewer of such instances? 16 A. No. Good point. The AMP, in one instance the 17 local AMP demonstrated that they weren't -- this 18 particular element of the local AMP were not to be 19 trusted, that we would get a level of comfort that the 20 prisoners would not be, the detainees would not be abused 21 and therefore we took it back from that particular local 22 AMP. As a matter of efficiency, as a matter of common 23 sense we developed a linkage with the NDS. 24 102. Q. This incident with the AMP, is this the 25 incident that you've described in paragraph 56 of your 32 1 affidavit? 2 A. That's correct. 3 103. Q. When did that incident occur? 4 MR. GRAHAM: We object to that question. *O* 5 MR. CHAMP: On what basis? 6 MR. GRAHAM: On the basis of national security. 7 MR. CHAMP: It threatens Canada's national 8 security to know when the Canadian Forces observed local 9 Afghan National Police beating a detainee that they 10 transferred to that unit? 11 MR. GRAHAM: We object to any questions on this 12 incident generally. *O* 13 MR. CHAMP: But you can swear an affidavit over it 14 but I can't ask any questions? Is that your position, 15 Counsel? 16 MR. GRAHAM: It is. 17 MR. CHAMP: I cannot ask any questions about this? 18 You can swear an affidavit to it but I cannot ask any 19 questions? 20 MR. GRAHAM: You have asked in number six for 21 documents and reports concerning that incident. You're 22 now asking for documents and reports concerning that 23 example and my position is that we object. 24 BY MR. CHAMP: 25 104. Q. Colonel Noonan, you learned of this incident 33 1 from reports I gather? 2 A. I did, yes. 3 105. Q. That's the basis of your information and 4 belief? 5 A. That's correct. 6 106. Q. Did you ever talk to any of the individual 7 Canadian Forces soldiers involved in that incident? 8 A. No, I did not. 9 107. Q. What was the medical condition of the 10 individual? 11 MR. GRAHAM: Object. *O* 12 MR. CHAMP: On what basis? 13 MR. GRAHAM: Same basis. Security. 14 MR. CHAMP: National security? 15 MR. GRAHAM: You're trying to get indirectly, 16 Counsel, what you can't get directly. 17 MR. CHAMP: I'm just trying to appreciate what 18 aspect of this, I guess, that if we knew the date that 19 would be some indication of when a particular combat 20 operation occurred, when we captured someone or something 21 but right now I'm just asking what the medical condition 22 of the individual. 23 MR. GRAHAM: I'm not prepared to allow any 24 questions concerning paragraphs 55 and 56 other than the 25 information that's there. 34 1 BY MR. CHAMP: 2 108. Q. Colonel Noonan, there is a medical examination 3 of all detainees before they are transferred, that's my 4 understanding? 5 A. That is the current practice, yes. 6 109. Q. Would there have been a medical examination of 7 this detainee before he was transferred? 8 A. I don't know. 9 110. Q. Were there any charges against the ANP police 10 involved in this matter? 11 A. I don't know. 12 111. Q. In paragraph 55 you describe another incident. 13 Is that the incident that was reported by CTV television 14 or is that a different incident? 15 A. I'm not sure. 16 112. Q. Are there other incidents aside from these two 17 that you're aware of? 18 A. Incidents of? 19 113. Q. Well, similar incidents where Canadian 20 soldiers exercised their discretion to either not transfer 21 or to take back a detainee because of concerns that the 22 detainees were at risk? 23 A. Those are the two that I am aware of. 24 114. Q. At paragraph 58 you speak about "two detainees 25 were transferred to the NDS and then we asked that they be 35 1 returned to us for further questioning." Was that for the 2 purposes of some kind of charges or something against 3 those individuals? 4 A. It was for the purposes of gaining further 5 intelligence. 6 115. Q. In paragraphs 62 and 63 of your affidavit you 7 indicate that "Canadian Forces were not aware of any 8 specific complaints regarding treatment of detainees 9 transferred to Afghan authorities by Canada." Are you 10 aware of any general complaints? 11 MR. GRAHAM: What do you mean by a "general 12 complaint"? 13 BY MR. CHAMP: 14 116. Q. Did individuals from either other armed forces 15 or from organizations, international NGOs, or the Afghan 16 Independant Human Rights Commission ever say to the 17 Canadian Forces that Canadian detainees are being abused 18 or tortured? 19 A. There was -- in my understanding there was no 20 specific allegations or complaints raised by any of those 21 organizations to Canadian Forces. 22 117. Q. I'm not speaking about specific individuals. 23 Just like someone saying "That's going on" because when I 24 read "specific complaints" it sounds to me like you're 25 trying to limit it. 36 1 A. No. There was no attempt to try and limit it. 2 As part of the overall look at Afghanistan what -- I might 3 be outside of my lanes here so -- we didn't receive 4 specific complaints and access to some of the reports, I'm 5 not sure which ones, were never specific in their 6 allegations. We didn't have -- we've never had a 7 complaint that had the specificity that allowed us to 8 investigate any further. 9 118. Q. Are you aware if Canadian detainees are being 10 segregated in some way in Afghan detention facilities? 11 A. I'm not aware. 12 119. Q. In paragraph 69 you refer to a meeting between 13 Brigadier General Tim Grant and the Afghan National 14 Directorate of Security in Kandahar, and General Grant's 15 role there was "to facilitate access by the Commission to 16 NDS facilities"? 17 A. That was one of his aims, yes, in that initial 18 discussion on the 25th. 19 120. Q. General Grant was successful in that, I 20 understand? 21 A. Because the following day, the 26th, he 22 facilitated the meeting between the director of the local 23 NDS and the AIHRC individual. 24 121. Q. In his role there did General Grant find out 25 how long the Commission had not had access to the NDS 37 1 facilities? 2 A. I don't know. 3 122. Q. Colonel Noonan, do you know if Canadian 4 detainees are in a number of different detention 5 facilities across Afghanistan? 6 A. I don't know. 7 123. Q. We don't know? 8 A. I don't know. 9 124. Q. Colonel Noonan, you are aware that there is an 10 investigation by the National Investigation Service into 11 allegations of certain detainees being abused? 12 A. I'm aware of one request by my commander to 13 have an allegation or a potential allegation of potential 14 Canadian Forces member -- inappropriate behaviour by a 15 Canadian Forces member. 16 125. Q. I don't need to ask you -- I'm talking about 17 actually the investigation that came out of the Military 18 Police Complaints Commission complaint and the issue I 19 want to ask you about is the efforts by the National 20 Investigation Service to locate those three detainees to 21 ask them questions. It's my understanding that the NIS 22 have not been able to locate those detainees? 23 A. I don't know. 24 126. Q. You have no information about that? 25 A. No. 38 1 127. Q. You don't know if they've located the 2 individuals? 3 A. I don't. 4 128. Q. You're aware that the NIS is looking for them? 5 A. No, I was not. 6 129. Q. I'd like to show Colonel Noonan the 7 Supplementary Affidavit of Alex Neve. It's in the Motion 8 Record, if that's what you're -- Motion Record, Volume I. 9 MR. GRAHAM: Here it is. 10 MR. CHAMP: Exhibit A. 11 MR. GRAHAM: Exhibit A. 12 BY MR. CHAMP: 13 130. Q. It's a newspaper article, "Canada Loses Track 14 of Afghan Detainees. Do you want to just take a look at 15 it for a couple of minutes and tell me if you have any 16 knowledge about the matter? 17 MR. GRAHAM: Counsel, I've already objected to 18 questions going to allegations of abuse by the forces. 19 You're not asking about that? 20 MR. CHAMP: I'm not asking about that. Absolutely 21 not. Sorry about that, Colonel. Just so you're clear, 22 I'm asking questions about the issue that these three men 23 have vanished in Afghan custody and unable to be located. 24 MR. GRAHAM: I think the witness has already told 25 you he has no idea whether these people have been located. 39 1 MR. CHAMP: I was trying to refresh his memory 2 once he took at that. I thought that might help him. 3 BY MR. CHAMP: 4 131. Q. You have no information about that at all? 5 A. Not that I'm aware of, no. 6 132. Q. That doesn't cause you any concern with 7 respect to the transfer of detainees to Afghan 8 authorities? 9 A. I don't -- I don't take military actions based 10 on media articles although unless it makes sense to do so. 11 133. Q. But the National Investigation Service are 12 saying that they can't find these men. 13 MR. GRAHAM: Well, Counsel, you're giving evidence 14 now. This witness has said he doesn't know that and I 15 suggest to you your question calls for speculation as to 16 what he might do based upon a state of knowledge he 17 doesn't have. *O* 18 BY MR. CHAMP: 19 134. Q. So you're saying to me, sir, that in CEFCOM no 20 one is aware of any of that information? 21 A. No. 22 135. Q. No one's heard of that? No one's aware of any 23 vanished detainees? 24 A. No. I'm not saying that. 25 136. Q. It hasn't come up? 40 1 A. No. I am not saying that. 2 137. Q. What are you saying then? 3 A. What I'm saying is I'm not -- in my affidavit 4 I'm trying to give you an idea of what I know. I don't 5 know the circumstances surrounding that except that 6 someone is investigating it as you've just told me, so 7 that's why we have an investigating service to do that for 8 us. 9 138. Q. No issues have been raised about the 10 preliminary findings of that investigation with CEFCOM? 11 A. Not that I have had to take for action. I'm 12 just not in the loop in that particular regard. 13 MR. CHAMP: I think I'm done, Counsel. I'm just 14 going to take a break for two minutes or maybe five 15 minutes. Is that okay? 16 MR. GRAHAM: Sure. 17 MR. CHAMP: I should be done. 18 (SHORT RECESS) 19 THE WITNESS: In my eagerness to provide you an 20 answer, the article that has been presented --- 21 MR. GRAHAM: This is Exhibit A to the 22 Supplementary Affidavit of Alex Neve. 23 THE WITNESS: Yes. Right. After having taken a 24 look at the headline, I had thought it was talking about 25 Canadians losing track of Afghan detainees in the process 41 1 of it. 2 MR. CHAMP: Sorry about that. 3 THE WITNESS: Okay, so it's my -- well, my fault. 4 I didn't read the entire thing. I am aware of the 5 incident in question on the 8th of April that's alluded to 6 in the media. I am not aware of the NDS -- sorry the NIS 7 investigations that are surrounding that, so if that 8 alters your line of questioning, I am aware of that. 9 MR. CHAMP: No. That's more what I was focusing 10 on. 11 THE WITNESS: Yes 12 MR. CHAMP: That other issue has nothing to do 13 with us as far as I'm concerned. 14 THE WITNESS: Right. 15 MR. CHAMP: What it is about here is the concern 16 is that if they're transferred to the Afghan authorities 17 and then we go asking from the Afghan authorities just 18 tell us, we have no idea where they are any more, can't 19 say if they were released or not or whatever, that that 20 would be an issue of concern to us. 21 THE WITNESS: So that's the clarification on that 22 one. 23 BY MR. CHAMP: 24 139. Q. You would agree that is an issue of concern 25 that if someone goes missing and they can't say what 42 1 happened to them one way or the other, that would be an 2 issue of concern to us? 3 A. I suppose it is. I suppose it is. 4 140. Q. I don't think it's a difficult proposition. 5 A. Right, yes. It's something that we're looking 6 at, I guess. 7 141. Q. I was just looking for the portion of your 8 affidavit -- okay. Can I take you to paragraph 37 of your 9 affidavit? Paragraph 37 you say, "The Canadian Forces do 10 not presently have the capacity or capability to establish 11 and manage a long-term detention facility in a deployed 12 theatre of operations." 13 Are you prepared to clarify that statement in 14 light of the doctrine now that I showed you with the 15 plans? 16 A. Sure, yes. The doctrine gives us a feel for 17 the prisoner of -- sorry -- a plan if we had to do a 18 prisoner of war holding area, what it would look like. 19 That doesn't mean that we actually have that capacity in 20 terms of people or capability in terms of skill set and in 21 fact we don't. 22 142. Q. But you had indicated to me that people do get 23 training to do that? 24 A. They are made aware of it and they -- even in 25 my training we have seen them -- they are made aware of 43 1 it. They practice it sometimes but very to small degrees, 2 trying to maintain some kind of understanding of what it 3 would take. 4 143. Q. Do you know how long it would take to build 5 one of those kinds of facilities? 6 A. The facilities, I'm not sure. Again I didn't 7 want to talk about bricks and mortar. It's about the 8 building of the capability and capacity for us to do it. 9 Historically, in terms of building capacity and capability 10 within a Canadian Forces, it's measured in months and 11 years to go from zero to -- or even the residual doctrinal 12 basis on which we have prisoner of war camps to actual 13 deployment of that capacity. 14 144. Q. When you say "historically", what historical 15 experience are you speaking of there? 16 A. One of my previous jobs was in the force 17 development world within the army and as we looked at 18 trying to develop new capabilities or ensure that we don't 19 have certain capabilities go to a point where they are no 20 longer useful. So if we identified a capability gap which 21 is always the case in any kind of organization and if you 22 needed to close that gap, that's measured in terms of -- 23 once you've identified that gap and then go towards 24 closing that gap, it's been my experience that it's been 25 months and years before you can actually get to that 44 1 capability. 2 145. Q. When you say "new capability" that's just in 3 general, not with respect to detention facilities 4 specifically? 5 A. Right. That's right. That's a general 6 comment. 7 146. Q. So as a general comment the development of new 8 capability to do anything can often take years? 9 A. Yes. 10 147. Q. That would be starting from zero to 11 developing, you know, early interim policies, interim 12 doctrines to --- 13 A. How to integrate it in wherever you want to 14 put it to, the skill sets that are associated with the 15 human resources, the dollars that are allocated for that 16 kind of activity. 17 148. Q. I accept your statement on that but that 18 doesn't necessarily apply to long-term detention 19 facilities. If I look at -- let's go back to the 20 document. It's in Hameed's affidavit, Volume II, Exhibit 21 Q. 22 A. What page? 23 149. Q. Start at page 3E6. You've gone past it. It's 24 at the bottom, 3E. 25 A. I've got a 3E3. 45 1 150. Q. You might have 3E13 --- 2 A. I see. Got it. 3 151. Q. The military pagination has kind of got me 4 nuts as well. Colonel Noonan is smirking at both counsel. 5 So if I could take you to 3E1-1, just the next page over? 6 So if you just look on the left side there, example of a 7 layout of a basic collecting point. You're an engineer, 8 right, sir? 9 A. I am, yes. 10 152. Q. How long do you think it would take to build a 11 facility like that? 12 A. To build this in terms of bricks and mortar? 13 153. Q. Well, in terms of what they're saying. Like 14 if I read it, there's a fence, barbed wire, post metal 15 fence, driver, picket, gloves, wiring, tape cut reel, 16 barbed wire --- 17 MR. GRAHAM: Counsel, do you mean actual 18 construction or --- 19 BY MR. CHAMP: 20 154. Q. Yes. Yes. Construction. The trench, so 21 forth, latrine, the cat wire fence. 22 A. Right. No, understood. I'm going to frame my 23 answer in the fact that it's irrelevant but it would not 24 take long. 25 155. Q. Why do you say it's irrelevant? 46 1 A. Because the permission to build that, the 2 skill set to man it, the underpinning legal authority to 3 do so would take much longer than it would take to 4 actually construct it. 5 156. Q. What is the skill set to do so? What's 6 required there? 7 A. The skill set is one not just of security but 8 understanding the rules under which you are manning that 9 holding facility, understanding the rules of engagement 10 that you would be operating under, in other words when, 11 if, how, to apply force, the ability to -- so that's the 12 people themselves that are actually doing that holding and 13 then putting within a command of control structure that 14 people need to understand again under which they can order 15 the application of force, under which they are being asked 16 to detain long-term, under what provisions they would do 17 so. 18 157. Q. Colonel Noonan, there is a temporary detention 19 facility operated by Canadian Forces at Kandahar air 20 field? 21 A. No. That's a transfer facility. 22 158. Q. It's a facility that's used to detain and hold 23 detainees for up to three days? There's four tents, 24 they're guarded --- 25 A. It's a facility where we hold the detainees 47 1 prior to transfer, yes. 2 159. Q. Up to three days? 3 A. The 96 hours so that's what? Three days or 4 four days? 5 160. Q. Four days. Pardon me. Four days. 6 A. Yes. 7 161. Q. It's a temporary detention facility? 8 A. No. It's a transfer facility. 9 162. Q. So the individuals who are there, they're 10 guarded, I gather? 11 A. Yes, they are. 12 163. Q. Those guards would be training about when and 13 if to apply force to those individuals? 14 A. That's correct, yes. 15 164. Q. There would be a command and control structure 16 that deals with the orders to those individuals, the 17 guards of when and if to apply force? 18 A. In its present construct, that's correct, yes. 19 165. Q. How is that different from a long-term 20 facility, sir? 21 A. We would have to go through that process to 22 determine that difference in exact detail. 23 166. Q. That would take years to do that? 24 A. Not the determination of the difference. 25 167. Q. Weeks? 48 1 A. I'm not sure how long it would take to do the 2 determination of the difference but it would not be the 3 critical path to the solution set if we have to go down 4 there. The critical path would be gaining international 5 concurrence to operate in this manner. 6 168. Q. Taking away the legal authority, I'm just 7 talking about the operational capability for the moment. 8 A. And again, once we've identified gaps, 9 providing solution sets that go to closing those gaps from 10 the operational capability would be training of personnel, 11 supplemental training --- 12 169. Q. How would it be different than the training 13 those individuals already have? They're guarding them. 14 They have to determine when and if to apply force. How 15 would the training be different? 16 A. They need to -- when and if to apply force, we 17 would either have to determine whether we would take those 18 personnel that -- because of the likelihood of increased 19 inhabitants of this and the time frame involved with it, 20 we'd have to determine where we would get these people 21 from, whether it would be in-theatre which takes away from 22 the job that they're currently doing or whether we would 23 have to build new capacity which -- sorry, yes, a new 24 capacity within which to generate these people, the 25 funding that's associated with it, the training that's 49 1 associated with it, the equipping that's associated with 2 it. 3 170. Q. What do you mean by "equipping"? 4 A. More people, more guns, more whatever types of 5 materials that are required, personnel. 6 171. Q. I understand that there is the concern about 7 redirecting personnel from other activities to manning a 8 detention facility for a longer period or with larger 9 numbers would be a concern. Is that the main concern? 10 A. That's one of the concerns. The other concern 11 that we do have is that without the proper training, 12 without experience in it, the execution of that may go 13 wrong as has been evidenced in my understanding of -- of 14 for example the Abu Ghraib situation. 15 Our folks have not been exposed to, historically, 16 nor have been for at least my generation to the holding of 17 detainees or prisoners of war, either one, in our 18 generation. We don't know the risk -- the lack of 19 knowledge that we have in the actual conduct of it is 20 significant. 21 172. Q. Because the Afghanistan mission is the first 22 true combat mission for the Canadian military since the 23 Korean world war? 24 A. That we've got to this level? Yes. 25 173. Q. I gather that the Canadian Forces have been 50 1 developing a lot of new capacities and skills over the 2 last two years in the course of their deployment? 3 A. We have been integrating some capabilities 4 that we have not deployed recently. But in terms of 5 brand-new skills? No. We've got infantry. We've got 6 armour. We've got competent engineers. Our ability to 7 deploy them better trained from lessons learned is there. 8 Our ability to integrate a new weapons system such as -- 9 not a new weapons system but the tank, we've been able to 10 do that but it's not an old -- it's not a new capability 11 that we've integrated into that force. 12 174. Q. Colonel, on page 3E2-1, I think it's just a 13 page over. There you go. That's a map or a layout of a 14 central collecting point for 200 prisoners of war? 15 A. Yes. 16 175. Q. How long do you think it would take to build a 17 facility like that? 18 A. A collecting point is after the conduct of an 19 operation, those that were detained or taken prisoner of 20 war are collected there with the intent to move them on, 21 back to the prisoner of war cage, back to potentially 22 long-term detention facilities. 23 176. Q. How long would it take to build it? 24 A. This one here again not a long time to build, 25 no, from an infrastructure perspective. 51 1 177. Q. The other one took I think they said an hour 2 and a quarter. 3 A. Yes. 4 178. Q. This one a day? A day, maybe? 5 A. Yes, sure. It depends on how many people you 6 have assigned to the task. 7 179. Q. At 3E3-1, example of a 500 prisoner of war 8 holding area compound. How long do you think it would 9 take to build that? 10 A. This is temporary again, tented accommodation, 11 some of them have latrines and ablutions. Again depending 12 on how many people you can assign to the job and how 13 quickly you can assemble the stores, once you've got that 14 altogether, you know, a week, maybe less. I don't know 15 what it says in the book. 16 180. Q. Actually I don't think it says exactly. It 17 doesn't say. At page 3F1-1 --- 18 A. Which is Appendix 1, I guess? 3F1-1, okay. 19 181. Q. It's Appendix 1, Outline Establishment for 20 Administrative Staff for Prisoners of War Holding Areas 21 and Camps? 22 A. Yes. 23 182. Q. It shows the list of different personnel 24 required to operate the 500 prisoner of war camp? 25 A. Yes. In theory that's what we think it will 52 1 take. 2 183. Q. I counted something, it's about 55 or so? 3 A. Sure. 4 184. Q. It doesn't have a list in here about how many 5 people it would take for the 200 prisoner -- pardon me -- 6 the 200-person prisoner of war facility. How many staff 7 do you think it would take to operate that one? 8 A. I have no idea. This is all theory. This is 9 doctrine. This is what we think it would take if we had 10 all of the bells and whistles and the authorities and all 11 of that kind of good stuff, that's what we think it would 12 take. 13 185. Q. So assuming that, all the bells and whistles 14 and so forth, how many people do you think it would take 15 to operate the 200-person prisoner of war holding camp? 16 A. I have no idea. That's not my area of 17 expertise. I look at this and it sounds reasonable. I 18 look at the bricks and mortar part because I am an 19 engineer. I can give you a better answer to that. So, 20 you know, looking at it that sounds reasonable in theory 21 of operating what could be a prisoner of war holding area 22 and camp. 23 MR. CHAMP: Colonel Noonan, thank you very much. 24 Those are all the questions I have for you. 25 THE WITNESS: Thanks. 53 1 MR. CHAMP: I want to thank you again very much. 2 --- THE EXAMINATION ADJOURNED AT THE HOUR OF 4:37 IN THE 3 AFTERNOON. 4 5 WE HEREBY CERTIFY THAT the foregoing was 6 transcribed to the best of our skill and ability, 7 from taped and monitored proceedings. 8 9 ................................................ 10 G R S / B L / S P 1 Examination No. 07-0465.2 Court File No. T-324-07 2 3 FEDERAL COURT 4 B E T W E E N: 5 AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL CANADA and 6 BRITISH COLUMBIA CIVIL LIBERTIES ASSOCIATION 7 8 Applicants 9 10 - and - 11 12 13 CHIEF OF THE DEFENCE STAFF 14 FOR THE CANADIAN FORCES, 15 MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENCE 16 and ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA 17 18 Respondents 19 20 21 ********************** 22 CROSS-EXAMINATION OF COLONEL STEVEN NOONAN ON AFFIDAVIT 23 sworn May 1, 2007, pursuant to an appointment made on 24 consent of the parties, to be reported by Gillespie 25 Reporting Services, on May 2, 2007, commencing at the hour 26 of 2:50 in the afternoon. 27 *********************** 28 29 APPEARANCES: 30 Paul Champ, for the Applicants 31 J. Sanderson Graham, for the Respondents 32 This Examination was monitored by Gillespie Reporting Services at 33 Ottawa, Ontario, having been duly appointed for the purpose. 1 (i) 2 3 INDEX 4 5 6 NAME OF WITNESS: COLONEL STEVEN NOONAN 7 8 EXAMINATION BY: MR. CHAMP 9 10 NUMBER OF PAGES: 2 THROUGH 53 INCLUSIVE 11 12 13 14 15 16 ADVISEMENTS, OBJECTIONS & UNDERTAKINGS 17 18 19 *O* . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6, 8, 22, 29, 32, 33, 39 20 21 22 23 24 25 EXHIBITS 26 27 (NONE ENTERED) 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 DATE TRANSCRIPT ORDERED: 02 MAY 2007 48 49 DATE TRANSCRIPT COMPLETED: 02 MAY 2007 50 51